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LIMITATIONS ON THE CORPORATE
PURCHASE OF ITS OWN SHARES
by
Carlos L. Israels*
F EW American corporation lawyers today would express any doubt
that a corporation has the power to purchase and thereafter retire,
or hold in its treasury for eventual resale, shares of its own capital stock.
That power, though once the subject of the most stubbornly fought con-
flict in corporation law,1 and still denied in England," is granted today in
all American jurisdictions, generally by specific statute.
The questions which arise today concern the propriety of the exercise
of the power, in a given set of circumstances, to avoid prejudice to credi-
tors of the corporation or to its shareholders-including those who sell
their shares to it as well as those who do not. The questions arise within a
framework of limitations on exercise of the power imposed by -statute
(state, and, more recently, federal), by contract, or by judicial decision
(again state, and, more recently, federal). Each such limitation has its
sanctions in the form of available injunctive relief or claims for damages
assertable against the corporation, its directors, or the shareholders who
have sold their shares.
1. STATE LAW
A. Statutory Limitations
The framework of limitation in state law springs generally from statute.
To illustrate, we select as typical the ABA Model Business Corporation
Act,' the Delaware General Corporation Law,' the New York Business
Corporation Law,' and the Texas Business Corporation Act.
The statutes outline a general-but not a complete--equation to divi-
dend law. The Model, New York and Texas Acts prohibit any purchase
of shares, as they prohibit any dividend in cash or property, while the
corporation is insolvent (in the equity sense of not being able to meet its
debts as they mature in ordinary course) or which would bring about
such insolvency.! The Delaware sections' are silent as to insolvency. How-
ever, according to Judge Learned Hand, the prohibition against the pur-
* A.B., Amherst College; LL.B., Columbia University. Attorney at Law, New York City;
Adjunct Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. This paper is adapted (with some
updating) from a talk delivered to the Corporation Section of the Texas Bar Association in July
1966.
'Nussbaum, Acquindion by a Corporaiioi of ]h* Own Stock, 35 CoLUM. L. Rzv. 971, 978
(1935).
$Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409 (1887), still states the rule.
a Hereinafter referred to as the Model Act.
'DEL. GEN. CORlP. LAy (1967).
'N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw (McKinney 1963).
Tnx. Bus. CoRP. AcT (1955).
'ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRp. Acr §§ 5, 40 (1966); N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAw 5 510, 513 (Mc-
Kinney 1963); TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT arts. 2.03F, 2.38A (1955).
8DEL. GEN. CoRP. LAw §§ 160, 170 (1967).
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chase of shares while insolvent is "not based on any legal statute but upon
general principles."
New York and Delaware prohibit the purchase of shares (1) except
from surplus,"° or (2) "when . . . capital is impaired" or the transaction
would cause such impairment."1 New York prohibits the payment of divi-
dends under similar circumstances,"1 but Delaware has its "nimble divi-
dend" provision, which permits payment out of earnings for the current
or the preceding year even though capital be impaired, provided the pay-
ment does not reduce net assets below the liquidation preference of any
shares which carry such a preference." Here the equation goes out of bal-
ance. The fund available for the nimble dividend is not specified as avail-
able for the purchase of shares." Similarly, as to wasting asset corpora-
tions both New York and Delaware apparently sanction dividends in ex-
cess of conventional surplus, but make no special provision for larger
share purchases.'
Under the Model Act there can be no purchase of shares except from
earned surplus. Similarly, no dividend may be paid except from unre-
stricted earned surplus. However, with the consent of the holders of two-
thirds of the voting shares, purchases may be made and dividends paid
from capital surplus as well."
The Texas pattern is based on the Model Act. Shares may be purchased
only from "unrestricted earned surplus available therefor"; but with
shareholders' consent (a two-thirds majority of all shares, with each class
voting separately-perhaps even if non-voting for any other purpose) the
purchase can be made from capital or reduction surplus."' Dividends of a
Texas corporation are also limited to "unrestricted earned surplus," but
with shareholders' consent a "distribution in partial liquidation" may be
made from reduction surplus." A wasting asset corporation in Texas may,
in addition, pay dividends or make a payment in partial liquidation out of
depletion or amortization reserves,1 but there appears to be no authoriza-
tion for it to purchase its own shares with funds so derived.
B. Contractual Limitations
Today, probably the most important and effective limitation under state
law upon the exercise of the corporate power to purchase its own shares is
found in the provisions of the senior securities and debt instruments (loan
'ln re Fecheimer Fishel Co,, 212 F. 357, 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 234 U.S. 760 (1914). The
New York dividend statute then in force (N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW S 58 (McKinney 1951)) made
no reference to insolvency. However, cf. UNuoam F A UDULENT CONvEYANCE ACT SS 4, 5; Bank-
ruptcy Act $5 67d, 70a, 11 U.S.C. §§ 107, 110 (1964).1 5N.Y. Bus. Co~ax. LAW § 513 (McKinney 1963).
"
1DE.. GEN. CoRp. LAW S 160 (1967).
" N.Y. Bus. Coaxp. LAw § 510 (McKinney 1963).1 1 DEL. GEN. Coaxp. LAW § 170 (1967).
14 Id. 5 160.
"SN.Y. Bus. Coax'. LAw § 510(b) (McKinney 1963); DEL. GEN. Co"P. LAW § 160, 170(b)
(1967).1
e ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoEP. ACT 5§ 5, 40, 41 (1966).
1TTEx. Bus. Coax'. ACT arts. 2.03C, 2.03D (1955).
191d. arts. 2.38A(1), 2.41A(2); cf. ABA-ALI MoDE.L Bus. Coax'. ACT 5 41 (1966).
19 TsT Bus. Coaxp. ACT arts. 2.39A, 2.41A(1) (1955).
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agreements or the like) of public corporations. Here the equation to divi-
dend restriction is substantially complete.
The normal pattern is to forbid both payment of any dividend (other
than in shares of a junior class) and the purchase or retirement of any
shares junior to the security for the benefit of wl'ich the restriction is im-
posed, except from earned surplus in excess of a stated amount or accum-
ulated after a specified date or both. Where the restriction is imposed for
the benefit of the holders of indebtedness the penalty will be accrual of
the right to premature the debt. Preferred shareholders would presumably
be entitled to injunctive relief and perhaps also to recovery of any sums
improperly applied (at least from responsible corporate officials if not
from the recipients).'"
C. Statutory Interpretation
Contracts for the purchase by a corporation of its own shares under
specified circumstances (sometimes including the mere passage of time) are
not uncommon. Historically these contracts have raised such difficult ques-
tions as: (a) "mutuality" or illusory promise (on the theory that at the
time the obligation matured the corporation might not have available
surplus); (b) contract illegal when made (no surplus), but legal when
performable (surplus available); and (c) contract legal when made (sur-
plus available), but illegal when performable (no surplus available).
However, the recent New York and Delaware statutes probably reflect
a trend to determine the propriety of enforcing the contract at the time
when by its terms it becomes performable and someone seeks to enforce
it.' Where a creditor (including a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy of
the corporation) is the plaintiff, the statutory rules tend to be strictly en-
forced. Not so when the plaintiff is a non-selling shareholder."
Aside from injunctive relief (often sought in contract cases) there are
sanctions in the form of personal liability. Participating directors are per-
sonally liable for both the illegal purchase of shares and the payment of an
illegal dividend. In New York and Delaware liability is for the full
amount paid out." In Texas liability is only for the amount paid in excess
of what could have been paid without violating the statute." There are
some interesting questions in this area. A director who votes for or assents
to the illegal act is liable, and one who is present and does not record his
dissent is deemed to have "assented."' But what if the director is absent?
"See discussion accompanying notes 23-24 inra.
"1DEL_ GEN. Cois.. LAw 5 160 (1967); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw 5 513 (McKinney 1963).
There appears to be no comparable Texas provision.
2Cases are collected by G. HoExnSmN, CoRpoRATiON LAW AND PRAcTIcE 55 491-99 (1959),
and by R. BArxR & W. CARY, CAE AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1401-39 (3d ed. un-
abridged 1959). Cases involving only the rights of other shareholders include Winchell v. Plywood
Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 85 N.E.2d 313 (1949); Barrett v. W.A. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass.
302, 175 N.E. 765 (1931); Gipson v. Bedard, 173 Minn. 104, 217 N.W. 139 (1927); Rasmussen
v. Roberge, 194 Wisc. 362, 216 N.W. 481 (1927).
"D.. GEM. CORP. LAW S 174(a) (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw S 719(a)(2) (McKinney
196 TUE. Bus. Co.p. Ac, art. 2.41A(2) (1955).
2Id. art. 2.41B.
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Texas is silent. New York places upon the absentee the burden of record-
ing his dissent "within a reasonable time after learning" of the action."
Delaware is even more strict. The absentee can exonerate himself only by
"causing his dissent to be entered on the books containing the minutes of
the proceedings immediately after he has notice of the same.""7
There is a trend also in the modern statutes to exonerate directors who
act in good faith reliance on accounting records, financial reports or state-
ments, etc." Texas specifies also the written opinion of counsel." But what
is "good faith"? "Honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned"?" Can the director merely plead "pure heart, empty head," or is
some higher standard of commercial reasonableness applicable?"' The share-
holders whose shares were illegally purchased likewise may be personally
liable. The majority rule imposes no liability on the shareholder who inno-
cently (i.e., without knowledge of the corporation's financial condition)
receives an illegal dividend from a solvent corporation." Where shares
have been purchased and creditors' interests impaired, however, recipient
shareholders have been required to respond." Query the rule which ab-
solves a selling shareholder from liability where only the interests of other
shareholders are involved. Has there been' "unjust enrichment" of the sell-
ing shareholder? Has he received a discriminatory (non pro rata) dividend
which, in fairness, he should disgorge?"
D. Equitable Grounds
The context under this heading for the most part involves purchases
by close corporations to "buy out" a decedent or dissident shareholder, the
employee whose connection with the corporation has been severed, or the
like. Usually all shareholders consent to, or at least do not protest the
transaction, and litigation, if it occurs, is settled at an early stage. The
cases which have reached the stage of reported decision have generally
involved another element-control of the corporation-which will be or
has been affected by the purchase.
All of the courts appear to agree that, as against non-selling sharehold-
ers, a corporate purchase made for the primary purpose of changing (or
"3N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 719(b) (McKinney 1963).
27DEL. GEN. Coap. LAW S 174 (1967) (emphasis added). "Notice" is defined in UNDsoas
COmMERCiAL COD S 1-201(25) as including "reason to know" whereas "learning" seems to re-
quire actual knowledge.
"DEL. GEN. Coap. LAW SS 141(e), 172 (1967); N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAW S 717 (McKinney
1963); Tax. Bus. Coup. AcT art. 2.41E (1955).
"Tx. Bus. Coap. ACT art. 2.41D (1955).
0UsmwOu.m ComwEatAcLt. CODE S 1-201 (19).
nN.Y. Bus. Co up. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1963) holds directors to a standard including exer-
cise of "that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions." Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (1967) which ends
with the word "circumstances." Are the standards the same? See Bishop, Sitting Ducki and Decoy
Ducks: New Trends in Indemnification of Corporation Officers and Directors, 77 YALE L.J. 1078
(1968).
"The cases are collected in R. BAKER & W. CARY, supra note 22, at 1371.
"Crandall v. Lincoln, $2 Conn. 73 (1884); Kleinberg v. Schwartz, 87 N.J. Super. 216, 208
A.2d 803 (S. Ct. 1965); Uflieman v. Boillin, 19 Tenn. App. 1, 82 S.W.2d 545 (1935).
8"C. Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank, 136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. App. 1962), aff'd, 149 So. 2d 45 (Fla.
1963).
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preserving) control is improper. Injunctive relief will lie, or management
may be held personally accountable.' However, there are substantial dif-
ficulties of proof, and the tendency (particularly where public-issue cor-
porations and directors' liability are involved) is not to find improper
purpose.'
There is almost no state court authority as to whether non-selling share-
holders are in some way entitled to "equality of opportunity" to sell. Such
a right is implied in one New Jersey case and in one Pennsylvania case,'
and it seems to be the official position of the New York Stock Exchange
that there should be some such right."' However, the only other state
court decision I have found is one in Delaware, which (as perhaps might
be expected) denies the right." There are probably at least two reasons
for the paucity of state decisional law in this area. The first is the failure
of state statutes generally to require any form of notification, or even
post-purchase disclosure, to non-selling shareholders. ' The other is the
growing tendency-because the transaction by hypothesis involves a "pur-
chase or sale" of securities, and almost invariably involves the use of
"means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or the mals"-to seek relief in the federal courts under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lob-5 under that Act."
II. FEDERAL LAW
A. Rule lob-5
Corporate purchase of its own shares has come within the purview of
federal law only since the adoption by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in 1943 of its Rule lob-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. The text of the Rule is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
"See Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (S. Ct. 1962); Andersen v. Albert &
J.M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d 541 (1950); Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co.
v. Sheckter, 400 Pa. 405, 162 A.2d 400 (1960); Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140 Wis. 476, 123 N.W.
102 (1909).
"Even in Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140 Wis. 476, 123 N.W. 102 (1909), the majority reached
this result; and see Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (S. Ct. 1964); Kors v. Carey,
39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960). I have criticized these Delaware decisions on substantive
grounds in two earlier articles, Israels, Are Corporate Powers Still Held in Trust?, 64 COLUM. L.
RaV. 1446 (1964); Israels, Corporate Purchase of Its Own Shares--Are There New Overtones?,
50 Co R. L.Q. 620 (1965).
" Gen. Inv. Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 98 N.J. Eq. 326, 129 A. 244 (Ct. App.
1925); Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co., 396 Pa. 320, 152 A.2d 894 (1959).
"8 N.Y.S.E. COMPANY MANUAL, at A-179 (1963); N.Y.S.E. LISTING AGREEMENT 5 I (1968).
"Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (S. Ct. 1952).
" See Kennedy, Transaction by a Corporation in Its Own Shares, 19 Bus. LAw. 319, 333 (1964).
The one exception is N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 $15(d) (McKinney 1963) which does require dis-
closure when reacquired shares are cancelled. However the required report is limited in scope and
content and is not likely to be genuinely informative.
41 15 U.S.C. 5 78a (1964); 17 C.F.R. S 240.1ob-5 (1968). The quoted phrase appears in many
sections of the federal securities acts. Its function, of course, is to state the basis of congressional
competence to regulate.
1968]
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a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, ii the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."
The Rule was adopted primarily to provide protection for the defrauded
seller of securities, as distinct from the defrauded buyer for whom the
Securities Act of 1933 already provided a protective network" and a num-
ber of the important proceedings initiated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Rule have dealt with corporate purchases of their
own shares. Indeed, the first proceeding brought under the Rule was
Ward La France Truck Corp.,' which required a corporation engaged in a
program of purchasing its own shares to disclose recent earnings figures and
pending negotiations for sale of control of the company at prices substan-
tially above the market in which the purchases were being made. More
recently the Commission's investigative powers and the Rule have been
brought to bear administratively against two other issuers'engaged in large
open market purchases of their own shares. SEC v. Georgia Pacific Lumber
Co." involved large open market purchases of shares, through trustees for
an employee pension plan, at a time when the company was engaged in
acquisitions in which the number of its shares deliverable could be depen-
dent on market price. The result was a consent decree limiting future
purchases to fifteen per cent of average daily and ten per cent of weekly
stock exchange trading volume. No opening bid is permitted and only one
broker can be used at a time. Genesco, Inc." involved a similar pattern
without the feature of the acquisition program. There future purchases
were limited by agreement to twenty per cent of average daily trading
volume and fifteen per cent of weekly volume. The company may bid
only the previous closing price on either a one hundred share block or fifty
per cent of the opening block traded, whichever is higher.' Thus, in a
public issue corporation context the Securities and Exchange Commission
has sought by direct action to impose conditions which will afford all
stockholders substantial equality of opportunity to sell whenever an issuer
embarks upon a substantial program of purchase of its own shares."
Equally important is the broad field of private litigation based upon
Rule lob-$. Since 1.I. Case Co. v. Borak" sustained an implied federal
cause of action for breach of the SEC's proxy rules, it generally has been
"See generally A. BRomBEiLG, SEcurrTIs LAW: FRAu--S.E.C. RuLE lob-S (1967), reviewed
by this author in 77 YA.E L.J. 1585 (1968).
"The story was interestingly told by the draftsman of the Rule, at a conference on codification
of the federal securities laws held in the fall of 1966. An edited transcript appears in 22 Bus. LAW.
793 (1967). See id. at 922 (Freeman).
44 13 S.E.C. 373 (1963).
CCH FED. Sac. L. RaP. 5 91,690 (1966).
"Id. 5 77,354 (May 10, 1966).
'For comment on the Georgia Pacific and Genesco cases, see Baker, Purchase by a Corporation
of Its Own Shares for Employee Benefit Plans, 22 Bus. LAW. 439 (1967).
'The same principle (though the purchases were made not by the corporation but by informed
"insiders") is implicit in the Commission's proceeding against Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., recently de-
cided in the Second Circuit. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. Sac. L. RaP. 5 92,251
(2d Cir. 1968).
49 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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conceded that if and when the question reaches the Supreme Court it will
sustain the existence of such a remedy under Rule lob-s . '
That such a cause of action may be asserted in the context of corpo-
rate purchase of its own shares is no longer open to argument."1 The more
recent cases which make the remedy (at least L: the form of injunctive
relief) available to the potential as distinct from the actual buyer or seller
only emphasize the point."' Most recently the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit' upheld a complaint on behalf of shareholders claiming
against their issuer which published for the benefit of its security holders
data which it "knew or should have known" was misleading." Similarly,
Surovitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., decided in the Seventh Circuit, found no
substantive difficulty with a complaint based on corporate purchase of its
own shares without disclosure of material information (e.g., recent figures
and the fact that insiders were proposing to "bail out" by tendering shares
along with the public at prices the insiders knew to be unjustified)."
These cases clearly indicate that the Rule is a potent weapon against cor-
porate purchase of its own shares to three classes of plaintiffs: (1) the sell-
ing shareholder as against the corporation which deliberately or negligent-
ly misstates or conceals material facts; (2) the non-selling shareholder on
the same state of facts or where he has been denied the opportunity to
sell-a fortiori where insiders have taken advantage of that opportunity;
and (3) the corporation (directly or at the instance of shareholders suing
derivatively) against "insiders" who misapply corporate funds in purchase
programs for their own benefit, e.g., for maintenance of control."
The thrust of the judicial opinions often focuses on what information,
misstated or wholly or partially undisclosed, is a "material" fact as that
term is used in clause 2 of SEC Rule 10b-5. Judicial definitions are many
and varied, but all tend toward the same concept: A fact is "material" if
it would be likely to affect the investment judgment of a reasonable man,
i.e., his decision whether or not to buy or to sell as the case may be." Often
the matter can be fairly judged only from the standpoint of a particular
defendant.
o Professor Bromberg's book, supra note 42, is an encyclopedia of the law.
51 See generally Note, Corporate Stock Repurcbases Under the Federal Securities Laws, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 1292 (1966).
"E.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial
Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967); Puharich v. Borders Elec. Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,141 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). And see A. BROMBERG, sura note 42, S 6.3.
"Since O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cis. 1964), probably considered a somewhat
".conservative" court in its interpretations of the Rule.
"Heit v. Weitzen, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP 5 92,279 (2d Cir. 1968).
342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
5$O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), denied a remedy under the Rule in such
a case; but subsequent decisions even in the Second Circuit do not seem in accord. See Carliner v.
Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1965); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). The injunction cases (e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1967)) are important here too. If, as in Hoover v. Allen, supra, no premium over market was paid,
is there no "corporate injury" and thus no remedy? One commentator suggests that the directors
could be liable for the total amount paid out, thus equating their position to what it would have
been had they bought for themselves. Note, Corporate Stock Repurchases Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1296, 1314 (1966).
57See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); A. BROMBERG, supra note 42,
$ 8.3.
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The recent Texas Gulf Sulphur case"8 illustrates the point. Information
which both the majority and the dissenting judges seemed to agree was
not sufficiently "hard" to have required disclosure to the market generally
and which in the corporate interest should not have been so disclosed, was
nevertheless deemed by the individual defendants important enough to
motivate their purchases of shares. Thus, the majority held that a "ma-
terial fact" had been concealed and Rule lob-5 violated.
In our specific context-corporate purchase of its own shares-it seems
that, in addition to adequate and generally available information as to the
financial condition and current operations of the issuer, at least the fol-
lowing items of information are prima facie material: (a) the identity of
the issuer as purchaser; (b) the purpose of the purchase; (c) the size and
scope of any purchase program; (d) the methods to be employed in car-
rying it out; and (e) the intentions of "insiders"-at least officers, di-
rectors and controlling shareholders-regarding the sale or retention of
their own shares. In general a pattern of requiring disclosure (including
these and other items peculiar to the facts of the specific case) appears to
be developing.
B. Recent Legislation: A New Chapter?
Significant amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were
adopted in 1964. Under those amendments the requirement of registra-
tion with the Securities and Exchange Commission under that Act was
broadened so that today it covers not only issuers having securities listed
on a national securities exchange but also any issuer having a minimum of
$1,000,000 of assets and an outstanding issue of equity securities held of
record by 500 or more persons." At the same time the reporting require-
ments of section 16 (a)" and liability for short-swing profits in securities
transactions under section 16(b)" were expanded to cover officers, direc-
tors and ten per cent shareholders of the so-called "12(g) companies"
(issuers with outstanding securities traded only over-the-counter but
which by reason of size and number of shareholders of record were re-
quired to register with the Commission under the Act).
On July 29, 1968, an additional important amendment to the 1934
Act became effective. This enactment, the Williams Bill,"' amends sections
13 and 14 of the Act," adding new subsections 13(d) and 13(e) and
14(d), 14(e), and 14(f)." Section 13 deals generally with reports by is-
suers of securities registered under section 12. Section 14 deals with solici-
tation of proxies from the holders of such securities. The new section
13(d) (1) now requires reporting to the Securities and Exchange Com-
" SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FEn. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,251 (2d Cir. 1968).
59These amendments are embodied in a new S 12(g), 15 U.S.C. S 781(g) (1964).
15 U.S.C. 5 78p(a) (1964).
eId. § 78p(b).
e' The bill was so called because of its sponsorship by Senator Williams of New Jersey. The bill
was S. 510 in the 90th Congress. As enacted, it became Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968).
3 15 U.S.C. 55 78n, 780 (1964).
"Codified as id. S§ 78n(d), 78n(e), 78o(d), 78o(f).
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mission by any person who becomes, directly or indirectly, a ten per cent
holder of an issue of equity securities registered under section 12. Sections
14(d) and 14(e) deal with so-called "tender offers" and solicitations in
defense against such offers. Where a change of control of the board is pro-
jected, section 14(f) requires disclosure about those persons proposed to
be elected or designated to the board "otherwise than at a meeting of se-
curity holders." The disclosure is effected by a filing with the Commission
and transmission to security holders of "information substantially equiva-
lent" to what would be required in a proxy statement for an annual meet-
ing.
Tucked in the middle (and clearly an integral part of the regulatory
scheme) is new section 13 (e) which deals specifically with corporate pur-
chases of their own shares. It reads:
(1) It shall be unlawful for an issuer which has a class of equity securities
registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or which is a closed-end invest-
ment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, to
purchase any equity security issued by it if such purchase is in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission, in the public interest or for
the protection of investors, may adopt (A) to define acts and practices which
are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and (B) to prescribe means rea-
sonably designed to prevent such acts and practices. Such rules and regula-
tions may require such issuer to provide holders of equity securities of such
class with such information relating to the reasons for such purchase, the
source of funds, the number of shares to be purchased, the price to be paid
for such securities, the method of purchase, and such additional information,
as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors, or which the Commission deems to be material to
a determination whether such security should be sold.
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, a purchase by or for the issuer, or any
person controlling, controlled by, or under the common control with the
issuer, or a purchase subject to control of the issuer or any such person,
shall be deemed to be a purchase by the issuer.
Thus, in effect, Congress has given us a checklist of presumptively
"material" information to be disclosed, and has left to the Securities and
Exchange Commission the task of filling out the picture by rule. The
Commission acted promptly. By its Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8370 (July 30, 1968), it adopted certain temporary rules under the new
law. However, only Rule 13e-16 is relevant, and it applies only in a very
narrow context. Once there is an outstanding tender offer by a person
other than the issuer, the latter may not purchase any of its securities
(not only those specifically affected by the offer) without first having (a)
filed with the Commission and (b) furnished to its security holders either
currently or within the past six months a statement covering: (1) the
title and amount of securities to be purchased, the names of the persons or
classes of persons from whom, and the market in which, the securities are
to be purchased, including the name of any exchange on which the pur-
65 Amended in immaterial respects by Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8392 (Aug. 30,
1968).
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chase is to be made; (2) the purpose for which the purchase is' to be made
and whether the securities are to be retired, held in the treasury of the
issuer, or otherwise disposed of, and indicating such disposition; and (3)
the source and amount of funds or other consideration used or to be used
in making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price or proposed
purchase price is represented by funds or other consideration borrowed or
otherwise obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or trading the
securities, a description of the transaction and the names of the parties
thereto.
It is anticipated that in due course the Commission will propose for
comment, and eventually adopt, broader and more detailed rules under
sections 13 (e) (1) and 13 (e) (2). At this writing one can only speculate
as to what areas will be covered. At the outset it will be noted that the
statute clearly indicates what direction the thrust must take because it re-
quires that the Rules "define acts and practices which are fraudulent, de-
ceptive and manipulative, and . . .prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent such acts and practices." It has been suggested (in my view prob-
ably correctly) that this statute does not give the Commission any more
power than it already had under section iob of the 1934 Act, and that the
entire area could have been regulated under Rule lob-5. The cases cited
above would seem to bear this out. On the other hand, civil litigation
under the Rule usually operates retrospectively, applying sanctions as to
past purchases. Operation in prospect--e.g., to restrain or to regulate con-
templated purchases-might well call for a new Commission Rule. The sta-
tute appears intended to fill that gap and the quoted language probably
does it fully as comprehensively as does the text of Rule lob-$ from which
it is derived." One peculiarly interesting facet is that section 13 (e) (2)
equates, for regulatory purposes, purchases by controlling persons (or per-
sons controlled by or under common control with the issuer) with those
made by the issuer itself. Presumably, this is a direct outgrowth of the
Georgia Pacific and Genesco cases, where the purchases were made not by
the issuer but by trustees who were in effect instruments of the issuer." The
concept of "manipulative" practice clearly includes not only activities
which might result in deception of a prospective seller of securities to the
company or of one who might determine not to sell in response either
to a private solicitation or a tender offer. It is also clearly intended to in-
clude practices which might in one way or another disturb an orderly
market. Indeed, the limitations- on the quantity and manner of trading
imposed in Georgia Pacific and Genesco8' look more in this direction than
they do to the interests of any specific selling or non-selling shareholder.
I have indicated above some items of material information which should
be made available to shareholders of any corporation which engages in a
substantial program of purchase of its own shares. In my view, disclosure
"See text accompanying note 42 supra.
" See Baker, Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Shares for Employee Benefit Plans,- 22 B us.
LAW. 439 (1967).
O See text accompanying notes 45, 46 supre.
[Vol. 22
CORPORATE SHARE REPURCHASE
should be required where such a program is to be carried out over a period
of time in the open market or by a public invitation for tenders either of a
specified number of shares at a stated price or of a sufficient number of
shares to exhaust a specific fund from which purchases are to be made at
the lowest tendered price." Certainly the Cominission should not (and
presumably will not) attempt by Rule to regulate the possible casual or
occasional corporate purchase of its own shares provided that such pur-
chase is made at arm's length, in open market, and not beyond a minimal
percentage of the shares outstanding. The Georgia Pacific and Genesco
cases suggest minimal percentages, below which (absent undisclosed ma-
terial information) purchases might be safely made and merely reported
to security holders annually or otherwise in due course. On the other hand,
I would suggest that corporations subject to the Rules be required to give
their shareholders adequate advance notice of any contemplated program
under which any number of shares above the minimum are intended to
be purchased. Such advanced notification should be achieved by a filing
with the Commission and by advice transmitted to security holders either
in an annual or interim report, or by a special mailing, stating the in-
tended scope of the program, its duration, the manner in which it is to be
implemented and whether or not to the knowledge of the company any
officer, director or ten per cent shareholder proposes to sell. The price also
should be specified, at least in relation to market. Conceivably the Rules
might require some form of undertaking that the corporation knows of no
material fact not disclosed in the specific communication or otherwise
generally available to shareholders,' disclosure of which would be neces-
sary in order to make the statements not misleading in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made.
Where purchase from a private person or persons is proposed, perhaps
regulation should be a bit more stringent. For example, it might require
advance notification by filing and communication to security holders if
either (1) the amount is above a stated minimum (e.g., more than two
per cent of the outstanding securities of the same class), or (2) if the pro-
posed price is above market. Query the extent to which advance notifica-
tion should be required as to purchases being made by a controlling per-
son for his own account under a program in which he does not directly or
indirectly act as an instrument of the corporation.
As should be obvious, my view is that once a corporation determines
to purchase its own shares all shareholders are entitled to some form of
"equality of opportunity" to sell their shares or to refuse to sell them
with the fullest benefit of advance notification and adequate disclosure of
all material facts. No well-advised corporation will undertake a purchase
program unless by an objective standard (typically availability of shares
" Resort to this sort of technique rather than reliance on private or open market purchase has
been increasingly common in recent years. Often use has been made of what has been termed a
"reverse prospectus" in order to be sure that adequate information is made available. See Zilber,
Corporate Tender Offers for Their Own Stock: Some Legal and Financial Considerations, 33 U.
CrNc. L. R1v. 315 (1964).70 E.g., because of inclusion in previous annual reports, public statements and the like.
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substantially below conservatively computed book or market value) it
appears to be in the corporate interest to do so. Where a private purchase
is proposed--certainly where the seller is an "insider"--even greater cau-
tion is called for. Does the transaction arguably present an opportunity to
market an otherwise unmarketable block of shares? If that is so (or in a
half a dozen other imaginable contingencies), is not a tender offer pro-
cedure rather than a private or even an open market purchase called for?
A scheme of regulation such as appears possible under the new statute
would go far, I suggest, to protect legitimate shareholder interests and,
should the Commission adopt rules requiring advance notification, would
encourage litigation seeking injunctive relief prospectively rather than
damages in retrospect. Clearly there is a developing body of federal cor-
poration law in many areas-and SEC Rule lob-5 has been a major con-
tributing cause.' The new statute brings the field of corporate purchase of
its own shares well within the ambit. If the securities involved are not
registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
federal courts will remain free to grant appropriate relief under Rule
1ob-5. If and when litigation arises in a state court, one may expect in the
long run some conformity to federal standards of managerial fiduciary
responsibility.72
' See, e.g., Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment, 78 -1Anv. L. REv. 1146 (1965).
And see A. BROMBEIG, supra note 42, Passim.
"See, eg., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1968).
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